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Abstract
Agricultural input subsidies are often considered key instruments to increase adoption
of new technologies in developing countries. Using unique experimental data from Equa-
teur province in DRC, we document the effectiveness of such interventions in increasing
households adoption of modern seed varieties (MVs). High subsidy levels increase adop-
tion, in particular when other access constraints were also relieved. Demand is highly
price sensitive, but demand curves do not display strong discontinuity at low prices. We
find very limited spillover effects on adoption by non-voucher recipients. Adoption persists
to some extent in the season that follows voucher distribution.
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1 Introduction
Approximately 75% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa remains dependent on agriculture
for its livelihoods. Increasing productivity and income for smallholder farmers is therefore one
of the highest development priorities, and is often seen as a cornerstone in the fight against
poverty and hunger. One of the oft cited causes for this low agricultural productivity is the
underutilization of technologies that are deemed profitable but that farmers are not adopting.
While modern input use has increased in the last decade, it still varies widely between and
within countries (Christiaensen, 2017). A large literature is dedicated to understanding the
causes of this underutilization, underlining behavioral constraints and market imperfections,
with important implications for the justification and design of input subsidy programs (see
World Bank, ed (2007), Jack (2013), de Janvry et al. (2017) for reviews).
This paper draws on a randomized control trial conducted in the Democratic Republic of
Congo to provide empirical evidence on the role of subsidies to prompt adoption of improved
seeds. In 60 randomly selected villages, households were randomly chosen to receive vouchers
to buy improved seeds at a subsidized price for five of the main staple crops. Vouchers were
distributed before the planting season to either a man or a woman in each household, with
price reductions of 30, 60, 90 or 100%. The vouchers could be redeemed (within 3 months)
at the offices of local seed-multipliers, at prices fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture. In
addition, in a randomly selected,subsample of 35 villages, a truck delivered seeds directly
in the village a few days after the voucher distribution, so households could redeem their
voucher. The truck delivery spared households the travel cost but left little time to gather
cash. In addition, trucks provided an opportunity to buy groundnuts (a legume) and/or
cereals, while seed multipliers offered mostly cereals in their local offices. This last difference
between villages with and without truck delivery was unintended. To test for spillovers in
technology adoption and general equilibrium effects, we introduced random variation in the
proportion of households in a village receiving vouchers (20, 45 or 70%).
The different experimental variations were designed to test different constraints to adoption,
to estimate price elasticities and to estimate diffusion of the improved seeds. The subsidies
effectively induced large variation in the adoption of improved seeds in the agricultural season
following the intervention and one year later, with impacts being larger for higher levels of
subsidy, and when access costs were lifted. While households were more likely to use their
vouchers in villages with truck delivery, those with low levels of subsidy bought smaller
quantities of seeds compared to households in villages without truck delivery.
This paper presents some background facts on agriculture in Equateur, describes the ex-
perimental design and data and presents results of the subsidies on adoption of improved seeds.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 Background: DRC and the Equateur Province
With 2.345 billion square kilometers, the Democratic republic of Congo is the second largest
country in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, 71% of the population of 67 million estimated
inhabitants lived under the poverty line, and three quarters of them in rural areas. DRC is
also home to the second largest tropical forest in the world, and holds 80 million hectares of
arable land (Herdeschee et al., 2012). Rainfall patterns allow for two annual rain-fed cropping
activities covering a variety of crops (Season A with planting starting in March, and Season B
with planting starting in August). Subsistence farming occupies 60% of the active population,
and generates 40% of GDP. During the Zairianisation in the 1970’s,1 the agricultural sector
was dislocated and large scale investments in agriculture were discouraged. Infrastructures
then collapsed during the Congo Wars (1996-2003), and inadequate infrastructure for the
transport of agricultural products limits commercialization. Although agricultural production
started to recover between 2006 and 2010, yields and aggregate production remain very low.
Agricultural productivity is particularly low in Equateur province in DRC, a remote region
with very extensive slash-and-burn agriculture, high levels of food insecurity and extreme
poverty, and arguably severe constraints to economic development in other sectors.2 While
historically plantation agriculture played an important role in the development of the province,
many plantations are currently abandoned, and households rely mostly on subsistence small-
holder agriculture through shifting cultivation of staples, as well as gathering of forest prod-
ucts, fishing and hunting.3, 4 While agricultural potential is believed to be large, road density
is very low, commercialization is hampered by long distances from farm to market, and most
farmers don’t have access to improved varieties or technologies. Traditional slash and burn
clearing methods are used, and the only capital inputs used are generally hand held tools.
Farmers traditionally purchase “seeds” from the food market or exchange it with neighbors.
To strengthen the agricultural sector in the province of Equateur, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture started implementing the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Recovery Support Project
(PARRSA: Projet d’Appui a` la Re´habilitation et a` la Relance du Secteur Agricole) in 2011
with the support of the World Bank. PARRSA works in 9 territories in the three northern
1“Zairianisation” is a nationalist political process launched in 1973 by president Mobutu, by which, among
other changes, agricultural businesses that belonged to foreigners were transferred to citizens of the DRC.
In many cases, the new owners did not continue to farm the land they received and many plantations were
abandoned.
2An administrative reform recently changed the administrative divisions. What was until 2015 the province
of Equateur is now divided in five smaller provinces.
3Plantations: palm oil, coffee, cotton, hevea, cocoa
4Staples: maize, rice, groundnuts, cassava, soya, niebe, yam, plantain
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districts of the Equateur Province.5 The intervention area comprises roughly 150.000 square
kilometers, and is at the heart of the Congo Bassin Forest. It is characterized by a large het-
erogeneity in access to land both between and within villages: while some villages are located
near the forest border, others are located further away and access to natural resources varies
widely (See Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Map of forest cover and villages localisation in the project
area
2.2 Evaluation design
The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Recovery Support Project aims at improving agricultural
productivity in the region through a variety of mechanisms (see appendix A for details). We
focus this paper on a one-time seed price subsidy program implemented in February-March
2013. Seed vouchers provided subsidized access to seeds of improved varieties of maize, rice,
groundnut, and soya, or stems of an improved variety of cassava. The varieties were selected
5Territories: Bosobolo, Budjala, Bumba, Gemena, Kungu, Lisala, Mobayi Mbongo, and Yakoma. Districts:
Nord Ubangi, Sud Ubangi, and Mongala.
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mainly for their high yield and/or short cycle characteristics and for their resistance to a very
widespread disease (mozaique) in the case of cassava.
A set of 92 villages was selected for possible targeting of seed subsidies based on their relative
accessibility by truck. The 92 villages are a subset of villages selected for a larger, orthogonal
extension experiment. The 92 villages were stratified based on size (below or above median
size), remoteness (a subjective indicator of accessibility), and treatment status of the PARRSA
extension intervention (see appendix A for details on the larger study). Respecting this
stratification, 32 villages were randomly selected as control villages for the seed vouchers, and
60 for distribution of seed vouchers.
The PARRSA team then distributed seed vouchers offering price reductions in the 60 treat-
ment villages, through public lotteries organized in each of them. Starting from census data
collected at baseline, randomly selected households received vouchers offering either 30, 60,
90 or 100% reduction on a maximum of 10 kg of any mix of the cereal or legume seeds on offer
(or equivalent amounts of cassava stems). The voucher was given to the man (the household
head) or his wife based on a second level random draw. For polygamous households, and if
the voucher was to be given to a woman, an additional random draw determined which of
the wives would receive it.6
Among the 60 villages, 35 were randomly selected to be visited by a truck with seeds of the
seed-multipliers in the days following the voucher distribution, effectively removing a potential
access constraint. Voucher recipients in the remaining 25 villages, as well as households of the
35 truck villages that did not redeem their voucher when the truck passed their village, could
redeem their vouchers and buy seeds at the offices of the seed-multipliers, commonly located
in the local town. Reaching the offices of the seed-multipliers typically required several hours
(and up to several days) of travel.7 The potentially more limited supply of different types of
seeds (and in particular the limited supply of groundnut seeds in the offices) further affects
access in this experimental variation.
The share of households receiving vouchers in each village was also experimentally varied in
order to assess potential spillovers and general equilibrium effects. In one third of treatment
villages, 70% of households received a voucher (high density), in another third 45% of house-
holds received vouchers (medium density) and in the last third only 20% received vouchers
(low density). In each treatment village, equal shares of 30%, 60%, 90% and 100% subsidy
vouchers were distributed. Across the 60 villages a total of 4394 vouchers was distributed.
6The full price for the improved seeds was 690 Congolese Francs (FC) per kg of Maize and Rice, and 920
FC for groundnuts. During the same season, the averages prices of traditional seeds on the local market were
respectively 544, 292 and 768 FC, while they reached 511, 350 and 864 FC for seeds labelled as ”improved”
and bought on the local market.
7Travel is in fact very slow in this region, where virtually no asphalted road currently exist, and households
mostly walk or rely on bicycle and sometimes motorbike for transportation.
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Careful administrative records were kept documenting the names, gender and subsidy levels
of all beneficiaries.
2.3 Data
A baseline survey was administered between March 2012 and July 2012. In each village, a
group of 4 to 5 people was selected to answer a community level questionnaire and establish the
village census. The group was composed of knowledgeable people in the village, including the
village chief, the director of the school, the director of the health center, and other notables,
depending on availability. The same group of people was asked about basic characteristics of
20 households from the village randomly picked in the census list. For those 20 households,
we hence have baseline proxy information on variables related to agriculture, demographics,
and participation in producer organizations.
A first follow-up was conducted between November and December 2013, i.e. after the agricul-
tural season following the lotteries (see the timeline in section A.3 in the Appendix). Sample
selection for the follow-up survey was done based on the initial census and the administrative
data from the public lotteries. In particular, in each of the treatment villages, we randomly
sampled 2 beneficiaries, a man and a women, for each level of subsidy (including zero, that is
households who did not receive a voucher). An additional man or woman was added for both
the 0 and 100% subsidy levels to maximize power. This gives a first group of 12 households,
for whom we collected detailed information about agricultural production in the season after
voucher distribution, in addition to information on take-up, perceptions and social networks.
Given that the voucher distribution was random, these 12 households can be compared to
12 randomly drawn households in the control. In all villages, the samples were stratified on
baseline membership in producer organizations, on having leadership positions in the village,
and on polygamy. For the second follow-up survey, the same 12 households were surveyed
again between June and July 2014 (Follow-up wave 2014). In this survey round, special effort
was done to obtain an exhaustive list of plots, resulting in an large increase of the number of
plots reported.
In this paper we concentrate on the sample of households who were sampled to be surveyed
both in 2013 and 2014. 8, 9, 10
8Almost all households who where sample to be surveyed in 2013 were sampled to be surveyed in 2014 as
well, but an additional stratified random sample of households was added to the sample in A 2014.
9Attrition is limited in both survey rounds with data on adoption missing for 6 and 2% of households in
2013 and 2014, respectively.
10Results obtained using the balanced panel or considering the full sample each year are similar to those
presented here and are available with the authors.
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2.4 Empirical Specification
The basic OLS specification is a simple difference model estimating the intent to treat (ITT)
impacts of receiving a price subsidy for improved seeds, allowing for differences between
villages with and without truck delivery. All regressions control for the stratification variables,
including indicator variables for the extension intervention.11 In those cases where there are
missing values for the covariates, we include the village sample mean. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. As we only have 92 villages, and as we introduce multiple
experimental variations at the village level, we test for the robustness of our findings using
randomization inference. Following (Young, 2017), we simultaneously also test for the joint
significance of the different coefficients in each equation, and across all equations in a table
using a Wald omnibus test. The omnibus test tests for statistical significance of all the
regressions in each table through randomization inference. We each time show the maximum
P-value and the random P-value. Complete results are shown in the Appendix D (Tables 8
to 11), and referred to in the text when relevant.
11As the extension intervention was randomized over a much larger set of villages, it is not the prime focus of
this paper. Appendix C discusses the impact estimates and interaction effects with the extension intervention
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3 Experimental Variation in Take-up and Adoption of Im-
proved Seeds
This section shows how subsidies impacted adoption of improved seeds in the short term.
The vouchers provided a subsidy to buy improved seeds from specific seed-multipliers, and
involved co-financing from the beneficiaries (cash and/or travel costs, except for subsidies of
100% in villages with a truck delivery). We start by presenting some descriptive statistics
about voucher utilization.
3.1 Voucher utilization and quantities bought
We draw on the administrative data collected during the voucher distribution, and the records
of seed sales (obtained both for sales from the trucks (delivery) and at the seed-multipliers
offices). Each voucher indicated the name and identifier of the household that received it,
and details about the sale were registered each time a voucher was used (including identity
of the buyer, identifier of the voucher, and quantities of seeds bought).
The administrative data shows that vouchers were very successful in convincing households
to get seeds, and that voucher take-up is higher for higher subsidy levels. In the sample
of interest for this paper (1098 households12), 533 households received a voucher, and 294
(55%) redeemed it to buy seeds either directly from a truck or from seed-multipliers. In
villages with truck delivery, the rate of use of vouchers was very high. Only 9 out of the
103 households did not use their 100% voucher (probably because they were absent on the
day the truck came), and 77% of the 90% vouchers used it as well. This figure drops to 56
and 48% for 60 and 30% vouchers respectively, but remains relatively high. As expected,
voucher use is lower in villages where households had to cover travel costs, but remains high.
In those villages, only close to 46% of households used their 100% vouchers. 40% for 90%
vouchers, 22% for 60% vouchers, and 14% for 30% vouchers. There are no big differences
in take-up in villages where a higher proportion of households received vouchers. In villages
without truck delivery, it is slightly stronger for higher share of households treated: 36%
of voucher recipients used their voucher in villages were 70% of households were given one,
37% in villages were 45% received one, and 22% in villages were 20% of households received
one. In villages with a truck delivery, around 70% of voucher recipients used their vouchers
irrespective of the percentage of households who received one. Overall, these take-up rates
suggest demand is highly sensitive to price but there appear not to be strong non-linearities
in the demand curves. Corresponding tables are available in Appendix, section E, Tables 12
12Due to the size of the village, the target sample was 11 instead of 12 households in one of the villages, and
7 in another
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We focus on groundnuts, rice and maize as the vast majority of sales occurred for these
three crops. For our main sample of interest, in villages with a truck delivery, among those
who redeemed their voucher, 72% bought groundnuts, 37% bought rice, and 28% bought
maize. In villages without a truck delivery, 41% bought rice, 25% bought maize, and 23%
bought groundnuts. If a relatively large share of households who redeemed a voucher used it
to buy soya in village with no truck delivery (29%), virtually none did so in truck villages.
The difference between villages with and without truck delivery is largely supply driven, as
groundnuts were not always available at the seed-multipliers offices.
In terms of quantities of seeds obtained, households from villages without truck delivery who
decided to use their voucher bought an average of 9.6 kilograms of seeds regardless of the level
of the subsidy. When a truck delivery took place after the lottery, however, households with
lower levels of subsidies (30 and 60%) only bought an average of 5.4 kilograms while households
with high subsidies (90 and 100) bought close to 10 kilograms on average. Our interpretation
of these differences is that they may reflect both selection and liquidity constraints. There
may have been a stronger selection of less-poor or more motivated households buying in the
villages without truck delivery (not only did they need to have cash, but also they had to
travel to the offices of the seed-multipliers). In villages benefiting from truck delivery, stronger
liquidity constraints likely played a role. The truck came to the village only a few days after
the lottery, so in those villages households who wanted to buy seeds from the truck had less
time to gather money. They also had the option to go buy later in the offices if they covered
their travel costs, but seldom used this option.
When differentiating by crops, we find that households in villages without truck bought very
small quantities of groundnuts compared to households who received a voucher and benefitted
from a truck delivery of seeds: 0.3 kg on average (and 1.4 kg for those who used their voucher),
compared to 2.5 kg for trucks (and 4.6 kg on average for those who used their voucher).
Differences are much smaller for maize and rice. Those who used their voucher bought on
average 3.1 kg of rice without truck, compared to 2.5 with truck. For maize, households with
vouchers without truck bought on average 1.9 kg compared to 1.2 kg in truck villages. The
quantities of improved seeds bought by households are critical in analyzing the impact of the
subsidies on sustained adoption and other input use since they determine the area that can
be sown, as well as the quantities harvested and possibly re-used the next season.14
13Doing the same exercise on the full sample of 4394 vouchers for the sample of all households living in the
92 villages of the experiment, give similar results. See tables 16 - 19
14Keeping quantities constant, the areas sown also differs between crops, as agronomists calculations suggest
that 10 kg of seeds would have been appropriate for planting .5 hectares of maize, .17 hectares of rice and
.1 hectares of groundnut, leading to expected production of 1000 kg of maize, 500 kg of rice, and 100 kg of
groundnuts. Keeping seeds from one year to the next is always a challenge, and to the extent it is harder to
keep some seeds when quantities are lower, these numbers suggest that it may have been harder to sustain
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To sum up, the different experimental variations created variation in take-up of improved seeds
in a number of ways. Randomly receiving a voucher had a positive impact on improved seed
purchases in 2013. The different subsidy levels resulted in experimentally-induced differences
in take-up and quantities. Households randomly assigned to the “truck” treatment used their
vouchers more, but when they did they bought smaller quantities of seeds. The “truck”
treatment is associated with more purchase of groundnuts. While the experimental variation
in prices, densities, and access led to the anticipated differences in take-up and quantities,
the differences in crop selection were not necessarily fully anticipated when designing the
experiment, and might well have been driven by a difference in supply.
3.2 Adoption just after the intervention, season A 2013
Because voucher use and use of improved seeds are likely endogenous to household charac-
teristics, we look at the impact of the exogeneously determined treatment status on adoption
(defined as the use of improved seeds on one of the household plots). We look successively
at the two years following the voucher distribution, focusing on “spring” planting, the main
season for agricultural production (season A), since some farmers don’t cultivate in the sec-
ond season). Our estimates are thus Intent-to-Treat ones, where the reported effect is that
of being given a voucher. All estimates presented in this paper include controls for a set of
strata dummies.
Tables 1 to 4 present the results, with each Table showing the impact of the different variations
in the interventions on seed adoption in the first season after voucher distribution (column
1), and one year after the voucher distribution (column 2). Column 3 shows the persistence
of adoption by looking at the probability to use improved seeds in both years. Finally, they
also show spillover effects on households who did not receive a voucher in treated villages.
We first discuss all results for season A 2013, and then those for A 2014.
Strong impact on adoption, stronger in truck villages
The voucher treatment had a clear positive impact on adoption, and a stronger impact when
associated with a truck delivery. Table 1 first reports the results without differentiating
by subsidy level. In the absence of any demand side intervention, adoption of improved
seeds in season A 2013 is rather low: only 9% of the households surveyed in the villages
where no lottery took place report using improved seeds. In A 2013, adoption of improved
seeds is 17.3 percentage points higher for households who received a voucher but no truck
delivery (significant at the 1% level) compared to households in control villages. The impact
of the voucher distribution is much larger in the villages where a truck delivery followed the
distribution of vouchers in the village: in those villages, adoption among voucher recipients
adoption for groundnuts, especially considering that groundnuts can be eaten directly without preparation.
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is 42.9 percentage points higher (significant at the 1% level) than in control villages. Finally,
Table 5 of the Appendix B further shows that vouchers in truck villages had a strong impact
on the probability to cultivating groundnuts in 2013 compared to control villages.
Sensitivity to price
Table 2 shows results differentiated by levels of subsidies, separately for villages with and
without truck delivery, and separating households who did not receive a voucher in treated
villages. Table 3 presents results grouping low levels of subsidy (30 and 60%) and high levels
of subsidy (90 and 100%) together. As expected, higher levels of subsidy have a higher impact
on adoption. The first column of Table 2 shows that adoption is very sensitive to price: lower
prices are associated with higher adoption rates. This result is consistent with similar findings
in the health literature (see Cohen et al. (2015); Dupas (2014); Tarozzi et al. (2014)) adoption
is much stronger with higher levels of subsidies indicating strong liquidity constraints, but
there is no strong drop off between 90% and 100 subsidy 15 If anything, the results may
indicate a non-linearity between 60 and 90% in the absence of truck delivery.
For households in villages with lotteries but no truck delivery, price reductions of 30 and 60%
have a small positive but non significant impact on adoption compared to control villages.
When the price is close to zero (90% reduction) or at zero (100% reduction) however, adoption
is higher by 25 percentage points (significant at the 1% level) and reaches 34%. The difference
between lower and higher subsidy levels is significant, as evidenced by the P-values of the test
of the difference between coefficients for different levels of vouchers presented at the bottom
of Tables 2 and 3. Moreover, adoption is stronger for all levels of subsidies for households
who benefited both from a voucher distribution and a truck delivery of seeds as compared to
control villages but also to villages who received only vouchers. Average adoption rates reach
33%, 40%, and 59% respectively for those who received a 30, 60 or 90% voucher, and up to
68% for households who got seeds for free. Again, the difference of impact between low level
and high level subsidies is significant, while the difference between 30 and 60% on the one
hand and 90 and 100% on the other hand is not significant.
Impact of the proportion of households treated
Table 4 presents the results for different proportions of targeted households in treated villages
(this proportion varied randomly between 20, 45, and 70% of the households). The proportion
does not have any significant impact on the probability that a household adopts in A 2013,
meaning that more people from the same village receiving a voucher did not influence a
household’s decision to use improved seeds, for the same level of subsidy.
15Miguel and Kremer (2004) find that increasing price of deworming from 0 to a very small price decreases
adoption from 75 to 19%.
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3.3 Sustained adoption, season A 2014
Use of improved seeds in season A 2014 is still low in control villages, but higher than in A
2013, indicating an overall increase in the availability of improved seeds in the region: 19%
of the households in control villages report using improved seeds in that year.16 In treated
villages, the high levels of adoption in season A 2013 may have helped farmers learn about the
new technology and potentially decide to re-adopt it. Besides buying new seeds, households
who bought seeds in one year can continue using them the next year if they manage to keep
some from the previous harvest. If the seeds are of good quality and if farmers carefully select
the seeds they keep, seeds will continue having a higher yield potential than locally available
ones one or two years after the purchase. We hence test whether households who received
vouchers in 2013 are using improved seeds one year later, in season A 2014, and whether
in particular those who adopted in 2013 sustained their adoption in 2014. We find that the
intervention had lasting effects on adoption of improved seeds.
Adoption is sustained
The evidence presented in Table 1 points to a positive impact of the subsidy remaining one
year after the intervention: in villages where vouchers were distributed without truck delivery,
adoption is 9.8 percentage points higher than in control villages (not significant). In villages
with both a voucher distribution and a truck delivery, adoption is 14.9 percentage points
higher than in control villages (significant at the 1% level). The difference between villages
with and without truck delivery is smaller and is no longer significant after one year. This
could be explained by a strong selection and/or the larger quantities bought by households in
villages without truck delivery, inducing a higher persistence in those villages. Tables 2 and 3
show that the difference between high levels of subsidies and low levels of subsidies is smaller
in 2014 than in 2013, and only significant for truck villages. The much smaller quantities
bought by beneficiaries of low levels of subsidies in truck villages limit the possibility of re-
using ones own seed and might explain the absence of a significant effect of the subsidy in
this second season, contrary to what happens to the beneficiaries of higher subsidy levels in
those same villages.
The third column in Table 1 also shows a relatively high impact on the persistence of adoption
one year after the intervention. While only 5% of households in the control used improved
seeds in both years, this increases to 26.7% in villages with voucher distribution and truck
delivery, and to 16.1% in other voucher villages. This could be driven by households being
able to either keep enough good quality seeds from their harvest to sow them again the
next year, or by households who buying new seeds again one year after trying them for the
first time. Comparing columns 1 and 3 shows that among those who adopted in 2013, a
higher proportion kept doing so the following year among beneficiaries of non-truck villages
16Increased availability is possibly induced by the supply side intervention of the PARRSA project
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(61%) compared to truck villages (51%). This points again toward the potential difference
in selection of adopters and the observed difference in seed quantities purchased between the
two arms of the treatment as potential explanatory factors. Comparing columns 2 and 3 also
indicates that part of the increase in adoption in A 2014 is still driven by new households
adopting.
Note that, neither in 2013 nor in 2014, there seem to be any interaction between the subsidies
and the orthogonal extension intervention that was carried out by PARRSA over the period.
The above results are therefore not affected when taking extension status into account (see
Appendix C).
Table 4 shows that while the intensity of voucher distribution had little impact on the prob-
ability of adoption in A 2013, it does make a difference in the following year, in particular
in villages with truck delivery. Column 2 shows in particular that the impact is 13 (16) per-
centage points lower in villages in which the percentage of households who got a voucher is
45 (70 respectively) as compared to villages where only 20% of households were treated. In
other words, the probability for a given household to keep using improved seeds is enhanced
when a smaller share of households in the village received a voucher. This implies that in
truck villages, the difference in the number of people adopting between villages with different
voucher density is smaller in 2014 than in 2013. Finally, the impact on the use of groundnuts
identified in 2013 in Table 5 vanishes in 2014.
3.4 Spillovers
We find only limited evidence of spillover effects. Tables 1 to 4 suggest that the lotteries
had spillover effects on adoption of improved seeds on non-voucher recipients, but only in
truck villages and only in the first season. In A 2013, adoption is 11 percentage points higher
for households who did not receive a voucher in village with a lottery with a truck delivery
compared to households in control villages. However, this result should be taken with caution
as it does not always resist randomization inference (P-value is only .11 for the corresponding
coefficient in table 1, see table 8 in Appendix D). The coefficient for non-recipients in villages
with vouchers without truck delivery is not significantly different from zero. We find no
significant effects for households that did not receive vouchers by 2014. Hence there appear
to be no longer-term spillovers on adoption in villages with lotteries, whether with or without
truck delivery.
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3.5 Summary
Overall, the results demonstrate that (1) there is more adoption when costs are lower: adop-
tion in season A 2013 is very sensitive to price, and adoption is higher when the access
constraint was relieved; (2) The difference in impact on adoption between the different levels
of subsidy is lower in villages with truck delivery, and decreased everywhere between the first
and the second year after the lotteries, in particular in villages without truck delivery; (3) for
those that use the vouchers, in villages with truck delivery they buy a different mix of crops;
(4) for those that use the vouchers in villages with truck delivery, the quantities of seeds
bought are also less compared to treated households in villages without truck, suggesting
selection and possibly motivation of households who use vouchers are different; (5) spillover
effects on adoption of improved seeds by non-voucher recipients is limited, and if at all, only
occurred in the first season after distribution, suggesting that improved seeds did not diffuse
within the village after the first harvests; (6) the probability to adopt in the season following
the voucher distribution is not influenced by the proportion of other households who received
a voucher in villages without truck, meaning that in higher density villages overall more peo-
ple are adopting. But the higher the share people receiving subsidies, the lower the impact
on adoption in season A 2014 in villages with truck delivery.
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3.6 Tables
Table 1 – Adoption of Improved Seeds Just After the Intervention and Two Seasons After the Inter-
vention
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher x no truck 0.173*** 0.098 0.111**
(0.050) (0.061) (0.045)
No voucher x no truck 0.046 0.052 0.056
(0.051) (0.059) (0.044)
Voucher x truck 0.429*** 0.149*** 0.217***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.031)
No voucher x truck 0.106** 0.053 0.035
(0.051) (0.057) (0.037)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean Control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-v test voucher/no voucher,no truck 0.01 0.38 0.28
P-v test voucher/no voucher, truck 0.00 0.05 0.00
P-v test voucher with-without truck 0.00 0.37 0.02
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.05 0.00
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds
are used. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while
No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify
the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All
regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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Table 2 – Adoption of Improved Seeds Just After the Intervention and Two Seasons After the Inter-
vention, by level of subsidy
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.091 0.158* 0.086
(0.073) (0.087) (0.060)
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.064 0.039 0.097
(0.069) (0.079) (0.066)
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.248*** 0.012 0.031
(0.081) (0.070) (0.058)
Voucher 100 x no truck 0.254*** 0.156** 0.191***
(0.070) (0.077) (0.069)
Voucher 30 x truck 0.240*** 0.065 0.100*
(0.059) (0.064) (0.052)
Voucher 60 x truck 0.312*** 0.072 0.108**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.046)
Voucher 90 x truck 0.498*** 0.226*** 0.309***
(0.073) (0.068) (0.064)
Voucher 100 x truck 0.590*** 0.205*** 0.308***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.047)
No voucher x no truck 0.045 0.052 0.055
(0.051) (0.060) (0.044)
No voucher x truck 0.105** 0.053 0.034
(0.052) (0.057) (0.037)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean in the control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-value Test 30-60 no truck 0.73 0.18 0.86
P-value Test 60-90 no truck 0.09 0.74 0.40
P-value Test 90-100 no truck 0.95 0.09 0.08
P-value Test 30-60 truck 0.28 0.94 0.89
P-value Test 60-90 truck 0.05 0.04 0.00
P-value Test 90-100 truck 0.27 0.78 1.00
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in no truck 0.53 0.22 0.65
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in truck 0.02 0.86 0.25
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.02 0.00
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds are used. Voucher is a dummy for
households who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and
no-truck variables specify the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions
control for a full set of strata dummies. The last rows present the P-value of the difference between coefficients for different levels of
vouchers, for villages with truck and villages without truck separately.
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Table 3 – Adoption of Improved Seeds Just After the Intervention and Two Seasons After the Inter-
vention, by level of subsidy (low or high)
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher low x no truck 0.077 0.099 0.091*
(0.059) (0.070) (0.054)
Voucher high x no truck 0.251*** 0.097 0.126***
(0.052) (0.062) (0.048)
Voucher low x truck 0.278*** 0.068 0.104***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.039)
Voucher high x truck 0.552*** 0.213*** 0.308***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.038)
No voucher x no truck 0.045 0.052 0.055
(0.051) (0.060) (0.044)
No voucher x truck 0.105** 0.053 0.035
(0.051) (0.057) (0.037)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean Control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-value test low-high no truck 0.00 0.97 0.44
P-value test low-high truck 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value test low no truck - low truck 0.00 0.67 0.83
P-value test high no truck - high truck 0.00 0.06 0.00
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.03 0.00
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds
are used. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while
No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify
the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All
regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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Table 4 – Adoption of Improved Seeds Just After the Intervention and Two Seasons After the Inter-
vention, by density of the treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.141* 0.094 0.071
(0.083) (0.091) (0.053)
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.172* 0.086 0.119
(0.091) (0.082) (0.083)
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.196*** 0.115 0.133*
(0.059) (0.102) (0.069)
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.460*** 0.244*** 0.303***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.039)
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.440*** 0.117** 0.188***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.041)
Voucher x truck x density 70 0.386*** 0.085 0.158***
(0.055) (0.061) (0.042)
No voucher x no truck 0.046 0.053 0.056
(0.051) (0.060) (0.044)
No voucher x truck 0.106** 0.054 0.035
(0.051) (0.057) (0.037)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean Control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-value test 20=45=70 no truck 0.84 0.97 0.73
P-value test 20=70 truck 0.27 0.03 0.00
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.02 0.00
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds
are used. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while
No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify
the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All
regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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4 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of subsidies in facilitating adoption of improved seed varieties in
Equateur Province in DRC. Randomized price subsidies - with or without lifting additional
access constraints - led to large and significant increases in adoption of improved seeds, induc-
ing more households to try these new seeds. Overall, the results show that demand is highly
price elastic and that liquidity constraints are an additional hurdle. It is noteworthy that the
demand curves do not display any strong discontinuity at low prices. Further, in the context
of the Equateur province, access costs are a significant limit to adoption: lifting them nearly
doubles the adoption rate relative to a situation where subsidies are offered but access is not
facilitated. It is also remarkable that spillover effects seem non-existent: however important
the share of households in the village who got facilitated access to improved seeds, we observe
no diffusion of their use. Finally, results on adoption persistence suggest that both a large
enough quantity of seeds purchased in the first place and a strong motivation are instrumental
in fostering continued used of improved seeds for the second season.
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A Details on the project and experimental design
A.1 The project : Dissemination of seeds, techniques and technologies to
improve agricultural production
The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Recovery Support Project (PARRSA for its acronym in
French) was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture , starting in 2011, with the Support
of the World Bank. PARRSA operates in 9 territories in the three northern districts of
Equateur Province in DRC. 17 PARRSA aims to improve agricultural productivity in the
region through a variety of mechanisms. Agricultural extension and advisory services in
Equateur province have been virtually absent for years and the availability of high quality
improved seeds is severely constrained. A first important objective of PARRSA is therefore
the regeneration of the market for improved seeds. In the phase prior to the phase covered
by the evaluation, the project assisted the national research institute (INERA) to resume
improved seed production in the region for maize, rice, groundnut, niebe, soya and cassava
and provided subsidies for the multiplication of improved seeds by selected agri-multipliers
in the region. The varieties were selected mainly for their high yield characteristics and for
their resistance to a very widespread disease (mozaique) in the case of cassava.
The evaluation focuses on subsequent interventions, implemented to encourage the demand
for seeds, including disseminate information about the improved seeds and related techniques
through demonstration plots and extension activities, as well as seed subsidies. In parallel,
the project also targeted 2,500 kilometers of feeder and access roads for rehabilitation.
A.2 Experimental design
A.2.1 Presentation of the evaluation
The evaluation aims at providing experimental evidence on the impact of several interven-
tions targeting demand constraints to the adoption of improved seed varieties and subsequent
welfare gains among poor smallholders in Equator province in the DRC. We measure the
impact of extension through demonstration plots, different levels and modalities of seed price
subsidies in a context of extensive slash and burn agriculture and strong gender division in
agricultural tasks. We introduce experimental variations that allowed targeting extension and
subsidies specifically to women and hypothesize that such gender targeting could increase both
the sustainability of adoption and the translation of the adoption of improved seeds in better
nutrition, health and education outcomes. The evaluation specifically focuses on such welfare
17Territories: Bosobolo, Budjala, Bumba, Gemena, Kungu, Lisala, Mobayi Mbongo, and Yakoma. Districts:
Nord Ubangi, Sud Ubangi, and Mongala.
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outcomes given the high levels of poverty, malnutrition, food insecurity and child mortality in
the region studied, and the importance of crop income in households income portfolio. Given
the extreme difficult road access in the region studied, the interventions were stratified based
on market access, and an experimental variation was introduced that eliminated transporta-
tion costs for improved seeds. To study diffusion patterns of the improved technologies we
introduce experimental variation in the density of the subsidies
A.2.2 Extension services
The extension interventions was implemented by local NGOs who organized a group of farmers
from a targeted village around a demonstration plot. An extension agent was in charge of
the introduction of the new seeds and adapted practices, and the group works in common
on the field, following the indications given by the agent. In a first set of randomly chosen
villages most members of the group are men. In the second randomly chosen villages the
extension agents had to organize groups around the demonstration plots with a majority of
women. In both type of villages, relatively small demonstration plots were first organized by
local PARRSA teams during 3 seasons (from spring 2012 to spring 2013). As of the fall of
2013, NGOs started organizing more intensive extension activities, and respect for men or
women targeting was imposed as a condition in the NGOs contracts with PARRSA.
The theory of change of the extension intervention is relatively straightforward. By introduc-
ing improved seeds on demonstration plots, households in targeted villages have the opportu-
nity to directly learn about the returns to such improved seeds. Households that participate
in the works on the demonstration plots also learn about complementary practices such as
row planting. And potentially, all households could get access to improved planting material
resulting from the harvests on the demonstration plots, though this should be relatively lim-
ited. Overall the extension intervention is expected to increase demand for and subsequent
adoption of improved seeds.
A.2.3 Lotteries and vouchers
Given the subsidies received by the supply side for seed multiplication, there was an open
question of the optimal pricing of seeds for the final user. A subset of 92 villages was selected
for possible targeting of seed subsidies. The PARRSA team then distributed seed vouchers
in a random subsample of 60 villages, with the remaining 32 villages serving as control).
Seed vouchers offering price reductions were distributed through public lotteries, organized
in each of the 60 villages. Starting from census data collected at baseline, randomly selected
households received vouchers offering either 30, 60, 90 or 100% reduction on a maximum of
10 kg of cereal or pulse seeds (or equivalent amounts of manioc stems). Once a households
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was randomly selected, a second draw determined randomly whether the voucher was given
to the man (the household head) or his wife. In case of polygamous households, and if the
voucher was to be given to a woman, the third random draw determined to which of the
wives the voucher was given. Among the 60 villages, 35 were in addition randomly selected
to be visited by a truck with seeds of the agri-multipliers in the days or weeks following
the voucher distribution, effectively removing a potential transportation constraint. Voucher
recipients in the remaining 25 villages, as well as households of the 35 truck villages that did
not redeem their voucher when the truck passed by their village, could redeem their vouchers
and buy seeds in the offices of the seed-multipliers, located typically in the local urban centers.
The share of households receiving vouchers in each village also varied in order to assess the
potential spillovers and general equilibrium effects.
The different levels of subsidies and targeting allows testing the importance of liquidity and
transportation constraints for the adoption of improved seeds. Indeed, we hypothesize that
the initial price at which farmers get access to improved seeds can be an important obstacle
in the context of Equateur, where households mainly live from subsistence agriculture and
liquidity constraints are severe. The theory of change we are testing is whether initial price
subsidies for a limited amount of seeds lead to more sustained adoption and higher demand
on the long run, once households have had an opportunity to learn about returns from their
own experimentation. In addition, given the extremely difficult road access in almost the
entire region covered by the project, we also hypothesize that transportation costs may add
to the existing liquidity constraints. The intervention that sends trucks to the villages was
designed to test this hypothesis.
A.2.4 Experimental design : selection into the program
Identification for the extension intervention and its gender targeting was based on ran-
domized assignment. As the extension intervention is based on demonstration plots or
fields to which all villagers can have access, this intervention was randomized at the
village level. The local district offices of PARRSA first selected 201 villages as potential
candidates for the initial phase of the intervention. The sample size was determined by
operational constraints, and reflected the number of villages PARRSA envisioned being
able to attend to in a first phase. The villages are spread over the 9 territories targeted
by PARRSA and cover an extensive geographical area (they belong to 154 different
Groupements, a lower administrative division). Village level baseline data was collected
for 201 villages, and for an additional 201 randomly selected neighboring villages. As
we hypothesize important treatment heterogeneity by accessibility, the 201 candidate
villages were stratified by organizing them in triplets based on similar proximity to roads
and markets. In each district, a public lottery was organized in February 2012 (prior to
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the first season of 2012). For each of the triplets, one candidate village was selected as
a women treatment, one village as men treatment, and the third village as control. In
the control group, no PARRSA extension activities took place until the second season of 2014.
Identification for the seed subsidy vouchers and their gender targeting was also based on
random assignment. First, among the original 201 villages selected for the extension inter-
vention, a subsample of 92 villages were purposely selected to enter the seed subsidy vouchers
experiment, based on being relatively accessible by truck. The 92 villages are spread across
Sud Ubangi, Mongala and North Ubangi, and across 5 (out of 9) territories in those districts.
The 92 villages were stratified based on size (below or above median size), remoteness (a sub-
jective indicator of accessibility), and treatment status of the PARRSA extension intervention
(control, women treatment, men treatment). Respecting this stratification, 32 villages were
randomly selected as control villages for the seed vouchers, 25 as voucher villages, and 35 as
voucher and truck villages. The number of treatment villages was based on logistical and cost
constraints. This randomization was done by computer, orthogonally to the extension treat-
ment. Stratification on remoteness should allow shedding light on the mechanism underlying
any potential difference between voucher and voucher+truck villages, while the stratification
on size was done to analyze potential differences in diffusion patterns based on village size.
In each of the 60 voucher villages, a public lottery was organized through which subsidy
vouchers for improved seeds were distributed. In 1/3 of randomly selected villages, 70% of
households received a voucher through this lottery (high density), in 1/3 random villages
45% of households received vouchers (medium density) and in the last 1/3 villages only 20%
received vouchers (low density). The variation in voucher density was introduced to study
whether diffusion of improved seeds is a function of village level intensity of initial exposure.
In each treatment village, equal amounts of 30%, 60%, 90% and 100% subsidy vouchers were
distributed through the lottery, with half of them randomly assigned to the household heads,
while the other half assigned to the (or a) wife of the household head. In case of polygamous
households, a randomization was conducted to determine which women would receive the
voucher. Across the 60 villages a total of 4344 vouchers was distributed. Given these large
numbers, and the household level randomization, the design results on substantial statistical
power to detect the direct impacts of receiving vouchers, differences between different levels of
subsidies, and differences between men and women beneficiaries. The differences in the level
of subsidies were chosen to get a better estimate of willingness to pay and advise on optimal
pricing, and to test any potential non-linearities (e.g. by analyzing differences between 90
and 100% subsidy).
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A.3 Timeline
Figure 2 – Timeline
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A.4 Data : baseline survey, followup surveys, and sampling strategy
A baseline survey was administered between March 2012 and July 2012 in 895 villages, in-
cluding the 201 villages of the experiment. In each village, a group of 4 to 5 people was
selected to answer a community level questionnaire as well as indirect household surveys for
20 randomly chosen households. For those 20 households, basic household characteristics
related to agriculture, demographics, and poverty are available. The group was composed
of knowledgeable people in the village, including the chief of the village, the director of the
school, the director of the dispensary, and other notables, depending on availability. Census
data was also collected.
A first follow-up was conducted between November and December 2013, i.e. after the agricul-
tural season directly following the lotteries. Data was collected in the 92 villages involved in
the lottery experiment. For the 60 voucher treatment villages, administrative records about
the beneficiaries identity and type of seed voucher received during the lotteries is also avail-
able. This administrative data was used for the sample selection of the follow-up surveys. In
particular, in each of the voucher villages, we randomly drew beneficiaries, stratified by level
of subsidy and gender (Male/Female; 0%, 30%/60%/90%/100%).
An additional men or women was added for 0 and 100% subsidy levels to maximize power.
This gives a first group of 12 households, for whom detailed information about agricultural
production in the season after voucher distribution, in addition to information on take-up,
perceptions and social networks was collected. Given that the voucher distribution was ran-
dom, these 12 households can be compared to 12 randomly drawn households in the control.
In all villages, the samples were further stratified on baseline membership in producer orga-
nizations, on having a leadership positions in the village, and on polygamy. In addition, the
same survey instrument was also implemented for the person that was the village leader at
the time of the lottery.
For an additional 10 random households (1 men and 1 women for each subsidy level) a short
survey was implemented on take up, perceptions and social networks. This sample again
includes 2 people with leadership positions. The sampling of the first followup survey was
targeted to understand take up and mechanisms leading to final outcomes, including impor-
tantly the potential to understand different diffusion mechanism through social networks, and
the potential example roles of local leaders to encourage adoption by others.
For the second follow-up survey in the 92 villages, the same 12 households for whom we
had detailed agricultural information in the first follow-up survey have been resurveyed. To
increase power,six additional households, for whom only a short survey was implemented in
2013, were added to the sample (two each with 0, 90 and 100% subsidies (one men, one
women for each household) in the voucher villages. Finally, an additional 8 households with
0 or 100% reduction (or 90% reduction when there was not enough households with 100%
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voucher) were added in the voucher+truck villages. Based on qualitative field work following
voucher distribution, we hypothesized that diffusion of information about the new technologies
might only circulate within very narrow social circles. We therefore added to the sample by
targeting a brother of the household head for the original 12 households living in the same
village (maximum 10 such brothers in each village). As there can be large inequalities in access
to land based on order in the sibship, we surveyed in particular the oldest brother (or a random
brother in case the original household is the oldest brother). Since the households of each of
those brothers were equally eligible for vouchers, they will have also been randomly exposed
to different subsidy levels and gender targeting. As such, this sample will not only allow us to
analyze diffusion within families, but will also allow to analyze to what extent impacts differ
depending on households access to land (forest) resources. For all these households, men
and women were interviewed separately, and two women were interviewed in polygamous
households (In case of polygamous households with more than 2 women, the first wife and a
randomly selected other wife were selected). In monogamous households with more than one
adult woman with children, the spouse of the household head and the mother of the youngest
child was interviewed. This sampling allows analyzing potential heterogeneity in child health,
nutrition and education outcomes within households. Because of the length and complexity
of the survey, we visited households twice : a first wave was conducted between June and
July 2014 (Followup wave 2014), and a second wave was conducted between November 2014
and March 2015 (Followup wave 2015). 18
18The second wave was originally scheduled to immediately follow the first wave, but was postponed due to
an Ebola outbreak in Equateur.
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B Impact on the choice of crops
Table 5 – Crops Cultivated, by Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Maize Rice Groundnut
2013
Voucher low x no truck –0.026 –0.046 –0.020
(0.074) (0.100) (0.083)
Voucher high x no truck –0.042 –0.026 0.023
(0.068) (0.105) (0.079)
Voucher low x truck –0.074 –0.041 0.182***
(0.065) (0.087) (0.069)
Voucher high x truck –0.050 –0.042 0.199***
(0.062) (0.079) (0.065)
No voucher x no truck 0.008 –0.030 –0.033
(0.083) (0.098) (0.074)
No voucher x truck –0.038 –0.115 0.064
(0.065) (0.081) (0.072)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 1047 1047
Mean Control 0.63 0.34 0.29
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.49 0.51 0.22
2014
Voucher low x no truck 0.082* –0.043 –0.019
(0.043) (0.093) (0.095)
Voucher high x no truck 0.010 0.005 –0.036
(0.046) (0.102) (0.086)
Voucher low x truck –0.045 –0.083 0.066
(0.053) (0.079) (0.077)
Voucher high x truck 0.004 –0.067 –0.026
(0.039) (0.070) (0.075)
No voucher x no truck –0.080 –0.059 –0.084
(0.057) (0.100) (0.080)
No voucher x truck –0.031 –0.122* –0.097
(0.052) (0.073) (0.076)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1079 1079 1079
Mean Control 0.86 0.30 0.51
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.77 0.39 0.60
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS regression: Dependant variables are dummies for whether household cultivate this crop, Voucher is a dummy for households
who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck vari-
ables specify the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a
full set of strata dummies.
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C Interaction with the Extension Services Intervention
As described Appendix A, the 92 villages in this study are a subset of villages selected for a
larger, orthogonal extension experiment. Since information is one of the potential contraints
to adoption of improved seeds, there may be synergies with the extension experiment (Tavneet
and Glennerster, 2017). We therefore present the results from the interaction between the
voucher and the extension experiments in Tables 6 and 7.
Overall, we find little evidence that the interaction between extensions services and vouchers
makes a difference. The is very little impact on adoption: if anything, extension slightly
reduces the effect of the vouchers on adoption for high subsidies in villages without truck
delivery.
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Table 6 – Adoption of Improved Seeds, interaction between subsidies and extension
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher x no truck 0.276*** 0.136 0.179**
(0.076) (0.092) (0.077)
Voucher x no truck x extension –0.149 –0.053 –0.096
(0.099) (0.122) (0.096)
No voucher x no truck 0.018 0.007 0.010
(0.072) (0.086) (0.060)
No voucher x Lottery no truck x extension 0.035 0.067 0.065
(0.098) (0.115) (0.083)
Voucher x truck 0.460*** 0.078 0.164***
(0.051) (0.064) (0.034)
Voucher x truck x extension –0.049 0.107 0.079
(0.072) (0.087) (0.054)
No voucher x truck 0.111 0.094 0.062
(0.081) (0.097) (0.055)
No Voucher x truck x extension –0.007 –0.060 –0.039
(0.104) (0.120) (0.071)
Extension 0.050 0.006 0.018
(0.047) (0.072) (0.038)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean Control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-v test voucher/no voucher,no truck 0.01 0.01 0.07
P-v test voucher/no voucher, truck 0.00 0.84 0.04
P-v test voucher-without truck 0.03 0.46 0.85
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.26 0.01
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds
are used. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages,
while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck vari-
ables specify the treatment arm. Extension is a dummy indicating whether the villages bene-
fited from the extension intervention. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level
in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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Table 7 – Adoption of Improved Seeds, interaction between subsidies and extension
(1) (2) (3)
Season A 2013 Season A 2014 Both seasons
Voucher low x no truck 0.152 0.104 0.140
(0.105) (0.116) (0.095)
Voucher low x no truck x extension –0.108 –0.006 –0.068
(0.128) (0.146) (0.117)
Voucher high x no truck 0.380*** 0.162 0.211***
(0.072) (0.101) (0.079)
Voucher high x no truck x extension –0.186* –0.090 –0.120
(0.100) (0.129) (0.099)
Voucher low x truck 0.315*** –0.022 0.042
(0.082) (0.072) (0.044)
Voucher low x truck x extension –0.058 0.136 0.091
(0.106) (0.099) (0.069)
Voucher high x truck 0.568*** 0.157** 0.255***
(0.063) (0.073) (0.051)
Voucher high x truck x extension –0.025 0.085 0.082
(0.090) (0.098) (0.072)
No voucher x no truck 0.017 0.007 0.010
(0.073) (0.086) (0.060)
No voucher x Lottery no truck x extension 0.035 0.067 0.064
(0.099) (0.115) (0.083)
No voucher x truck 0.111 0.093 0.062
(0.081) (0.097) (0.055)
No Voucher x truck x extension –0.008 –0.060 –0.039
(0.104) (0.120) (0.071)
Extension 0.050 0.006 0.018
(0.047) (0.072) (0.038)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1034 1077 1020
Mean Control 0.09 0.19 0.05
P-value test low-high no truck 0.02 0.61 0.37
P-value test low-high truck 0.01 0.01 0.00
P-value test low no truck - low truck 0.21 0.26 0.33
P-value test high no truck - high truck 0.04 0.96 0.62
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.22 0.00
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether improved seeds
are used. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages,
while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck vari-
ables specify the treatment arm. Extension is a dummy indicating whether the villages bene-
fited from the extension intervention. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level
in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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D Tables, Randomization Inference
Table 8 – Randomization Inference, Table 1
randomization c
P-value
randomization t
P-value
1
Adoption, Season A 2013
Voucher x no truck 0.005 0.002
No voucher x no truck 0.52 0.394
Voucher x truck 0.001 0.001
No voucher x truck 0.114 0.057
Equation 0 0
2
Adoption, Season A 2014
Voucher x no truck 0.088 0.14
No voucher x no truck 0.452 0.389
Voucher x truck 0.002 0
No voucher x truck 0.413 0.394
Equation 0.014 0.021
3
Adoption, Both Seasons
Voucher x no truck 0.017 0.026
No voucher x no truck 0.286 0.204
Voucher x truck 0 0
No voucher x truck 0.505 0.384
Equation 0 0
max c P-value randomization c P-value
Omnibus test 0.001 0
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set
of strata dummies. The Equation lines present the results of the randomization tests for each equation, while the
Omnibus test is a test of the overall experimental significance for all the regressions in the table.
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Table 9 – Randomization Inference, Table 2
randomization c
P-value
randomization t
P-value
1
Adoption, Season A 2013
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.216 0.237
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.382 0.373
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.001 0.011
Voucher 100 x no truck 0 0.002
Voucher 30 x truck 0.001 0.001
Voucher 60 x truck 0 0
Voucher 90 x truck 0 0
Voucher 100 x truck 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.48 0.395
No voucher x truck 0 0
Equation 0 0.001
2
Adoption, Season A 2014
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.026 0.097
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.58 0.613
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.878 0.874
Voucher 100 x no truck 0.018 0.063
Voucher 30 x truck 0.262 0.313
Voucher 60 x truck 0.226 0.277
Voucher 90 x truck 0 0.004
Voucher 100 x truck 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.431 0.411
No voucher x truck 0 0
Equation 0 0.161
3
Adoption, Season A 2013
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.133 0.173
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.087 0.159
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.596 0.602
Voucher 100 x no truck 0.002 0.02
Voucher 30 x truck 0.035 0.074
Voucher 60 x truck 0.022 0.035
Voucher 90 x truck 0 0
Voucher 100 x truck 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.269 0.218
No voucher x truck 0.272 0.447
Equation 0 0.039
max c P-value randomization c P-value
Omnibus test 0 0
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set
of strata dummies. The Equation lines present the results of the randomization tests for each equation, while the
Omnibus test is a test of the overall experimental significance for all the regressions in the table.
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Table 10 – Randomization Inference, Table 3
randomization c
P-value
randomization t
P-value
1
Adoption, Season A 2013
Voucher low x no truck 0.267 0.224
Voucher high x no truck 0.001 0.001
Voucher low x truck 0.001 0.001
Voucher high x truck 0.001 0.001
No voucher x no truck 0.519 0.382
No voucher x truck 0 0
Equation 0.001 0.001
2
Adoption, Season A 2014
Voucher low x no truck 0.12 0.186
Voucher high x no truck 0.092 0.127
Voucher low x truck 0.186 0.203
Voucher high x truck 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.425 0.393
No voucher x truck 0 0
Equation 0.001 0.007
3
Adoption, Both Seasons
Voucher low x no truck 0.076 0.127
Voucher high x no truck 0.007 0.016
Voucher low x truck 0.014 0.025
Voucher high x truck 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.287 0.23
No voucher x truck 1 1
Equation 0.983 0
max c P-value randomization c P-value
Omnibus test 0.001 0.001
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set
of strata dummies. The Equation lines present the results of the randomization tests for each equation, while the
Omnibus test is a test of the overall experimental significance for all the regressions in the table.
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Table 11 – Randomization Inference, Table 4
randomization c
P-value
randomization t
P-value
1
Adoption, Season A 2013
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.134 0.142
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.056 0.12
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.021 0.017
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.001 0.001
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.001 0.001
Voucher x truck x density 70 0 0
No voucher x no truck 0.554 0.458
No voucher x truck 0.007 0.006
Equation 0 0
2
Adoption, Season A 2014
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.272 0.329
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.308 0.351
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.098 0.29
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.001 0.001
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.086 0.041
Voucher x truck x density 70 0.205 0.201
No voucher x no truck 0.261 0.235
No voucher x truck 0 0.001
Equation 0.001 0.06
3
Adoption, Both Seasons
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.298 0.237
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.056 0.202
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.018 0.116
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.001 0.001
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.001 0.001
Voucher x truck x density 70 0.004 0.008
No voucher x no truck 0.181 0.134
No voucher x truck 0.999 0.999
Equation 0.983 0.001
max c P-value randomization c P-value
Omnibus test 0.002 0.002
Source: Follow up surveys waves 2013 and 2014, panel households
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set
of strata dummies.The Equation lines present the results of the randomization tests for each equation, while the
Omnibus test is a test of the overall experimental significance for all the regressions in the table.
35
E Take up rates, Administrative data
E.1 Households samples in the 2013 survey
Table 12 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds, administrative data, sample of households surveyed in
2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher x no truck 0.323*** 0.082*** 0.134*** 0.070** 0.096* 0.044
(0.063) (0.031) (0.043) (0.027) (0.051) (0.028)
No voucher x no truck 0.012 –0.001 –0.000 0.003 0.014 0.001
(0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.003)
Voucher x truck 0.708*** 0.200*** 0.268*** 0.505*** 0.007 0.009
(0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007)
No voucher x truck –0.001 –0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-v test voucher/no voucher,no truck 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.13
P-v test voucher/no voucher, truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.37
P-v test voucher with-without truck 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.23
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for households surveyed in 2013
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether the voucher was redeemed.
Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-voucher indicate
non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify the treatment arm. Robust
standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set of
strata dummies.
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Table 13 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Detailed Subsidy Level, administrative data,
sample of households surveyed in 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.142** 0.000 0.043 0.018 0.041 0.081
(0.063) (0.004) (0.030) (0.023) (0.043) (0.055)
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.224*** 0.061* 0.084* 0.018 0.082 0.059
(0.071) (0.034) (0.046) (0.022) (0.056) (0.043)
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.406*** 0.122** 0.145** 0.142** 0.082 0.061
(0.081) (0.060) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.043)
Voucher 100 x no truck 0.458*** 0.124** 0.226*** 0.093** 0.154** –0.002
(0.075) (0.048) (0.072) (0.037) (0.066) (0.004)
Voucher 30 x truck 0.485*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.303*** 0.001 –0.000
(0.064) (0.048) (0.038) (0.061) (0.005) (0.003)
Voucher 60 x truck 0.562*** 0.095** 0.226*** 0.363*** 0.029 0.026
(0.060) (0.037) (0.048) (0.060) (0.027) (0.027)
Voucher 90 x truck 0.775*** 0.225*** 0.242*** 0.545*** 0.000 0.013
(0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.062) (0.004) (0.014)
Voucher 100 x truck 0.913*** 0.301*** 0.425*** 0.711*** 0.001 –0.000
(0.029) (0.052) (0.058) (0.049) (0.006) (0.003)
No voucher x no truck 0.011 –0.001 –0.001 0.003 0.013 0.001
(0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.003)
No voucher x truck –0.002 –0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
Mean in the control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value Test 30-60 no truck 0.15 0.08 0.41 0.98 0.34 0.64
P-value Test 60-90 no truck 0.00 0.31 0.24 0.02 0.92 0.96
P-value Test 90-100 no truck 0.22 0.97 0.19 0.21 0.07 0.17
P-value Test 30-60 truck 0.31 0.43 0.03 0.39 0.31 0.33
P-value Test 60-90 truck 0.02 0.02 0.81 0.02 0.31 0.66
P-value Test 90-100 truck 0.03 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.80 0.34
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in no truck 0.05 0.72 0.13 0.44 0.55 0.15
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in truck 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.16
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for households surveyed in 2013
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether the voucher was redeemed. Voucher is a dummy for
households who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and
no-truck variables specify the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions
control for a full set of strata dummies. The last rows present the P-value of the difference between coefficients for different levels of
vouchers, for villages with truck and villages without truck separately.
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Table 14 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Subsidy Level, administrative data, sample of house-
holds surveyed in 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher low x no truck 0.182*** 0.030* 0.062** 0.017 0.061 0.070
(0.061) (0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.045) (0.043)
Voucher high x no truck 0.436*** 0.123** 0.191*** 0.112*** 0.124** 0.024
(0.075) (0.049) (0.060) (0.040) (0.059) (0.016)
Voucher low x truck 0.524*** 0.113*** 0.168*** 0.333*** 0.015 0.014
(0.050) (0.036) (0.035) (0.049) (0.014) (0.014)
Voucher high x truck 0.856*** 0.270*** 0.349*** 0.643*** 0.001 0.005
(0.026) (0.040) (0.050) (0.041) (0.005) (0.007)
No voucher x no truck 0.011 –0.001 –0.001 0.003 0.014 0.001
(0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.003)
No voucher x truck –0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value test low-high no truck 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10
P-value test low-high truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.57
P-value test low no truck - low truck 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.23
P-value test high no truck - high truck 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.30
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for households surveyed in 2013
Note: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether the voucher was redeemed. Voucher is a dummy
for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in
treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify the treatment arm. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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Table 15 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Treatment Density, administrative data, sample
of households surveyed in 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.225* 0.063 0.120 0.078 0.131 0.041
(0.130) (0.045) (0.093) (0.047) (0.127) (0.041)
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.371*** 0.141** 0.110* 0.065 0.013 0.082
(0.113) (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.015) (0.076)
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.359*** 0.047 0.165** 0.070* 0.139* 0.014
(0.085) (0.045) (0.063) (0.036) (0.083) (0.011)
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.727*** 0.226*** 0.270*** 0.538*** –0.001 0.000
(0.046) (0.049) (0.064) (0.053) (0.013) (0.005)
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.707*** 0.222*** 0.296*** 0.495*** 0.024 0.021
(0.047) (0.066) (0.072) (0.080) (0.018) (0.018)
Voucher x truck x density 70 0.688*** 0.155*** 0.242*** 0.481*** –0.002 0.007
(0.043) (0.053) (0.043) (0.047) (0.005) (0.010)
No voucher x no truck 0.012 –0.001 –0.001 0.004 0.013 0.000
(0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003)
No voucher x truck –0.001 –0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value test 20-45 without truck 0.39 0.30 0.93 0.86 0.34 0.65
P-value test 45-70 without truck 0.93 0.21 0.53 0.93 0.16 0.38
P-value test 20-45 with truck 0.75 0.96 0.79 0.66 0.29 0.29
P-value test 45-70 with truck 0.78 0.43 0.52 0.88 0.19 0.52
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for households surveyed in 2013
Note: OLS Regression: The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether the voucher was re-
deemed. Voucher is a dummy for households who received voucher in treatment villages, while No-
voucher indicate non-beneficiaries in treatment villages. Truck and no-truck variables specify the
treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regres-
sions control for a full set of strata dummies.
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E.2 Census of households living in the 92 villages of the experiment
Table 16 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds, administrative data, census of households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher x no truck 0.298*** 0.060*** 0.156*** 0.057*** 0.069** 0.016**
(0.059) (0.018) (0.052) (0.017) (0.029) (0.008)
No voucher x no truck 0.002 0.002 0.003 –0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Voucher x truck 0.629*** 0.131*** 0.223*** 0.484*** 0.003 0.007
(0.022) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028) (0.003) (0.004)
No voucher x truck 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 –0.000 –0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-v test voucher/no voucher,no truck 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06
P-v test voucher/no voucher, truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.14
P-v test voucher with-without truck 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.30
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for the census of households in 92 villages
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a
full set of strata dummies.
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Table 17 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Detailed Subsidy Level, administrative data, census of house-
holds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher 30 x no truck 0.145*** 0.012** 0.077* 0.029*** 0.027 0.016
(0.044) (0.005) (0.039) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012)
Voucher 60 x no truck 0.215*** 0.040** 0.107*** 0.037*** 0.050 0.017
(0.053) (0.015) (0.039) (0.013) (0.030) (0.012)
Voucher 90 x no truck 0.350*** 0.074*** 0.188*** 0.069*** 0.075** 0.011
(0.074) (0.026) (0.065) (0.026) (0.030) (0.007)
Voucher 100 x no truck 0.485*** 0.115*** 0.254*** 0.092*** 0.125** 0.020**
(0.082) (0.034) (0.078) (0.023) (0.053) (0.010)
Voucher 30 x truck 0.357*** 0.063*** 0.118*** 0.232*** 0.005 0.009
(0.042) (0.018) (0.027) (0.035) (0.004) (0.007)
Voucher 60 x truck 0.490*** 0.068*** 0.158*** 0.352*** 0.005 0.008
(0.035) (0.016) (0.027) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005)
Voucher 90 x truck 0.754*** 0.147*** 0.251*** 0.595*** 0.002 0.009
(0.022) (0.035) (0.044) (0.033) (0.002) (0.008)
Voucher 100 x truck 0.916*** 0.247*** 0.365*** 0.760*** 0.002 0.001
(0.010) (0.048) (0.050) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002)
No voucher x no truck 0.002 0.002 0.003 –0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
No voucher x truck 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 –0.000 –0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265
Mean in the control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value Test 30-60 no truck 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.47 0.35 0.91
P-value Test 60-90 no truck 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.57
P-value Test 90-100 no truck 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.32
P-value Test 30-60 truck 0.00 0.73 0.13 0.00 0.97 0.59
P-value Test 60-90 truck 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.86
P-value Test 90-100 truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.34
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in no truck 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.22
P-value Test voucher 30-no voucher in truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.19
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for the census of households in 92 villages
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a full set
of strata dummies. The last rows present the P-value of the difference between coefficients for different levels of
vouchers, for villages with truck and villages without truck separately.
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Table 18 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Subsidy Level, administrative data, census of house-
holds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher low x no truck 0.180*** 0.026*** 0.092** 0.033*** 0.038* 0.017*
(0.045) (0.009) (0.038) (0.011) (0.021) (0.009)
Voucher high x no truck 0.417*** 0.094*** 0.221*** 0.081*** 0.100** 0.016**
(0.077) (0.030) (0.071) (0.024) (0.041) (0.007)
Voucher low x truck 0.424*** 0.066*** 0.138*** 0.292*** 0.005 0.008
(0.035) (0.015) (0.024) (0.033) (0.004) (0.006)
Voucher high x truck 0.835*** 0.197*** 0.308*** 0.677*** 0.002 0.005
(0.012) (0.039) (0.045) (0.030) (0.002) (0.004)
No voucher x no truck 0.002 0.002 0.003 –0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
No voucher x truck 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 –0.000 –0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value test low-high no truck 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.74
P-value test low-high truck 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.46
P-value test low no truck - low truck 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.00 0.12 0.43
P-value test high no truck - high truck 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.20
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for the census of households in 92 villages
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control for a
full set of strata dummies.
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Table 19 – Take-up of Vouchers for Improved Seeds by Treatment Density, administrative data, census
of households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All crops Maize Rice Groudnuts Soja Cassava
Voucher x no truck x density 20 0.203* 0.057 0.092 0.076** 0.083 0.028
(0.104) (0.035) (0.083) (0.033) (0.083) (0.027)
Voucher x no truck x density 45 0.238*** 0.107*** 0.073** 0.039* 0.032 0.019
(0.084) (0.040) (0.035) (0.023) (0.029) (0.015)
Voucher x no truck x density 70 0.367*** 0.028 0.232*** 0.064** 0.091* 0.011
(0.078) (0.020) (0.077) (0.025) (0.047) (0.009)
Voucher x truck x density 20 0.692*** 0.147*** 0.228*** 0.545*** –0.002 0.001
(0.031) (0.044) (0.065) (0.056) (0.004) (0.001)
Voucher x truck x density 45 0.636*** 0.191*** 0.239*** 0.471*** 0.012 0.013
(0.043) (0.049) (0.068) (0.046) (0.009) (0.011)
Voucher x truck x density 70 0.609*** 0.094*** 0.215*** 0.475*** 0.001 0.005
(0.027) (0.031) (0.042) (0.041) (0.003) (0.005)
No voucher x no truck 0.002 0.003 0.002 –0.002 –0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
No voucher x truck 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 –0.000 –0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Strat Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265 14265
Mean Control 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value test 20-45 without truck 0.80 0.35 0.83 0.36 0.55 0.76
P-value test 45-70 without truck 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.46 0.30 0.68
P-value test 20-45 with truck 0.30 0.51 0.91 0.31 0.19 0.28
P-value test 45-70 with truck 0.60 0.10 0.76 0.94 0.22 0.49
P-v Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Administrative data for the census of households in 92 villages
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All regressions control
for a full set of strata dummies.
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